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1 Introduction
In parliamentary democracies policies reect a legislative debate where all po-
litical parties, in power and at the opposition, contribute to the nal outcome.
The role parties have in shaping the national policy, arguably, depends on their
strength, i.e. on the number of seats they have in parliament. Recently the po-
litical economics literature has shown a growing interest in understanding the
role of political institutions in shaping national economic policy (see Persson,
2002). In this paper we focus on the rules for electing a legislature. The politi-
cal science literature (see Cox, 1997) has identied in the electoral formula the
main dimension in which legislative elections di¤er.1 In this paper we analyze
a multidistrict majoritarian election and a single-district proportional election,
which are the two most studied systems (see, among many others, Persson and
Tabellini 2000, Cox 1997). The common viewpoint has been that parties rela-
tive strength is given by their share of votes. We believe it is time to let the
number of seats in parliament play a role.
Specically, we study a society, composed by policy motivated strategic cit-
izens, electing a parliament of k members by voting for representatives of two
parties (L and R, say). Seats in parliament are allocated to the two parties
according to the electoral result. In the literature on parliamentary election
(see, among many others, Persson and Tabellini 2000, Alesina and Rosenthal
1996, De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni 2007) the simplifying assumption is that the
vote share taken in the election is equal to the seats share in parliament, and
thus policies directly depend on the share of votes. We take the point of view
that the policy outcome is dened on the number of seats parties win in the
election. We hence explore what we believe to be the intriguing consequences
of a seemingly minor departure from this common feature of the literature.
Multidistrict majoritarian elections
We rst study a situation where citizens (with single-peaked preferences) are
distributed in k districts (a generic district is denoted by d) and vote strate-
gically in each one by majority rule. The electoral result (i.e. a pure strategy
combination) determines the number of seats for the two parties in parliament.
We capture the idea of a parliamentary compromise between the two parties
with di¤erent strengths by assuming that the policy outcome is a function de-
creasing in the number of districts won by the leftist party. To solve such a
voting game the issue of the solution concept needs to be addressed. Given
the typical weakness of the Nash solution concept in this type of games, we
turn to renements. To see why this is the case, consider an election in one
district: the election of any candidate is a Nash equilibrium outcome when
there are more than three voters. Di¤erently from standard models with two
1Another important dimension is naturally the district size (see Cox, 1997). Papers analyz-
ing how di¤erences in district size a¤ect the policies are among others, Persson and Tabellini
(1999), Myerson (1993), Milesi-Ferretti et al (2000).
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parties also the concept of undominated equilibria fails to have byte in such a
voting game. Let us dene by k the policy outcome obtained by averaging the
outcomes when L takes k and (k   1) seats. Similarly, denote 1 the average
policy when party L wins 1 and 0 seats. Only voters located on the left/right
of the k/1 policy have dominant strategies, i.e. voting for the L/R party.
We dene an outcome as pure if it assigns probability one to a given pol-
icy. We then propose a natural solution concept in this context, which we call
district-sincerity. A strategy combination is district sincere if each player who
strictly prefers (given the strategies of the players in the other districts) that
party L/R wins in his district, votes for party L/R. We prove that the voting
game has a unique district-sincere outcome in pure strategy, which is also the
unique district-sincere pureoutcome. Such an outcome is characterized by a
number of seats for the leftist party equal to the number of districts d whose
medians md are smaller or equal to the corresponding d (that is again the
average policy when party L wins d and d  1 seats).
We then turn our attention to tremblig-hand-perfection, which is a rene-
ment of the undominated equilibrium concept and, as we will show, of the
district-sincerity concept as well. We do so because we want to compare the re-
sults obtained in the multidistrict majoritarian case with the proportional one,
in which a concept like district sincerity does not make any sense. We prove
the existence of a unique pure strategies perfect equilibrium outcome, which is
obviously the unique district-sincere outcome in pure strategies, and the unique
pureoutcome induced by perfect equilibria.
Proportional election.
We then turn our attention to a situation in which citizens (with single-
peaked preferences) are distributed in one national district electing k repre-
sentatives. There are various mechanisms to transform votes into seats under
proportional rule, we use a very general one by simply assuming a minimum
number of votes needed to get a certain number of seats for the leftist party.2
Again, the policy outcome is simply a decreasing function of the number of seats
won by the leftist party. Similarly to the majoritarian election and even if we
have a two-party scenario, also in this case the undominated equilibrium concept
does not help in solving the game. Except for voters located on the left/right of
the k/1 policy, voters do not have dominant strategies. Also in this context,
we prove that there exists a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome,
which is also the unique pureoutcome induced by perfect equilibria.
The main advantage of having a unique equilibrium outcome is naturally
in that we can compare the outcomes in the two systems. We carry out such
a comparison upon various distributions of playersbliss policies. We consider
two leading cases. The rst one identies a situation where each district of the
majoritarian system is a replica, in terms of mediansbliss policies distribution,
2Such a formulation allows, for example, any majority premium.
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of the national district of the proportional system: the case with full homo-
geneity across districts. The second case investigates the circumstance under
which the districts (of the majoritarian system) are equally sized and ordered
according to the political preferences of their voters from left to right:3 this is
the case of maximal dishomogeneity across districts. We nd that in the case
of homogeneity across districts, the outcome may di¤er depending on which
electoral system is adopted. A single district proportional system favors a more
moderate outcome, since it protects minorities dispersed in di¤erent districts
more than a multidistrict majority system. In the case of extreme heterogene-
ity across districts, the outcomes are instead the same independently of the
electoral system. Hence, di¤erences in electoral outcomes are a joint product
of the electoral system and the distribution of voters. In societies where leftist
voters are concentrated in some districts and rightist voters in others the choice
of the electoral system - proportional vs. multidistrict majority- will tend not
to a¤ect the political outcome, while in societies where electoral districts are
similar to each other in terms of the political preferences of their voters, the
outcome will tend to be more moderate when elections are held with a propor-
tional system than when elections are held with a multidistrict majority system.
This is fairly intuitive since with a lower concentration of like-minded voters,
in a multidistrict majority system fewer votes are wasted on a candidate who
would win anyway.
From the analysis of the above voting games we want to emphasize two
points. The rst one deals with the solution concept. The second one relates to
the use of strategic voting per se.
As already explained in the previous lines, the Nash solution concept is not
adequate to solve the voting games we dene. Moreover, regardless of the two-
party structure, also the undominated principle is not helpful. Nevertheless, if
we resort to the trembling-hand-perfect solution concept we obtain a unique out-
come in pure strategies. As already pointed out, extending to mixed strategies
such an outcome is the only one assigning probability 1 to a given policy.
Let us spend now few words on the use of strategic voting. A common
criticism to such an approach is that strategic voting models have multiple out-
comes, and such multiplicity is more severe the larger the size of the electorate
... regardless of the solution concept that is used (Merlo, 2005, p. 15). This
paper points out that this is not necessarily the case.
Related literature.
As pointed out at the beginning of this introduction, this paper belongs to
the non-majoritarianliterature of legislative election (Alesina and Rosenthal,
3Specically equally sized districts have been ordered according to the political preferences
of their voters, with the rst district being inhabited by the rst n
k
most leftwing voters, the
second by the next n
k
most leftwing voters and the following districts being inhabited each by
n
k
increasingly more rightwing voters.
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1996), which focuses not on which party has the majority in parliament, but
rather on the composition of it. The main contribution of this paper is to carry
out such an analysis by not relying on the assumption that the vote share taken
in the election is translated into an equal seats share in parliament. We dene
instead the policy outcome as function of the number of seats parties win in
parliament.
Furthermore, this paper relates to three strands of the political economy
literature: the multidistrict majoritarian, the proportional elections and the
recent growing literature on the comparison of policy outcomes under di¤erent
electoral rules.
Many scholars analyzed elections under multidistrict majority rule. Palfrey
(1989) seminal paper proves that in an uncertain framework strategic voting
under plurality rule leads to duvergerian equilibria.4 Cox (1994, 1987, 1997) in
many contributions analyzes a k-candidates m-seats model, nding duvergerian
equilibria, based on a rational expectations condition. Austen-Smith (1986) de-
velops a model, with two candidates, in which voters, located in various districts,
vote taking into account the policy outcome, which is a probabilistic function
of the set of winning districts representatives. Callander (2005) studies parties
competing over a continuum of districts under plurality rule, but when voters
act sincerely. He nds a duvergerian result, and policy does not converge to the
median position.
Concerning the proportional elections, the most related paper is Alesina and
Rosenthal (1996) in which they analyze the strategic voting behavior of a con-
tinuum of voters facing an institutional context where there are two branches
of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislature,
elected by proportional rule. The policy outcome is the result of the compromise
between these two branches: hence the composition of the legislature is crucial.
The main implication of this model is that divided government (that is the
situation in which the majority in Congress is in favor of the party who has lost
the presidential election) can be explained through the behavior of voters with
intermediate (that is, situated in between partiesannounced positions) prefer-
ences, who take advantage of the institutional structure above, balancing the
plurality of the winning party in the executive by voting in favor of the opposite
party in the legislative election. The solution of such a voting game relies on a
coalition-proof behavior (to be precise they use a renement of coalition-proof,
the abstract stable set), the main reason being the necessity to circumvent the
di¢ culties arising from the assumption of a continuum of voters.5
Finally, there is a growing interest in the issue of how di¤erent institutions
may a¤ect national policies. Persson-Tabellini (1999, 2000) model two-party
4By duvergerian equilibria is meant that under plurality rule only two-party equilibria
emerge (Duverger, 1954).
5A di¤erent strand of the literature takles the question of voting under proportional repre-
sentation by dening also a post-electoral bargaining stage among elected parties (see, among
others, Baron and Diermeier, 2001).
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competition in two scenarios dened by the electoral rule: proportional versus
majoritarian elections. Proportional rule is characterized by a single national
district, and, hence, winning more than 50% of the votes of the population
means winning the election. Majoritarian elections are dened under plurality
rule (rst past the post) in three single-candidate districts, each one coinciding
with a specic group of the population. Winning means winning two out of the
three districts. The model is solved by assuming two forms of uncertainty (for
whole population and group-specic). The main result is that in majoritarian
countries (as opposed to proportional ones) elections increase competition in
key districts, leading to an increase in targeted redistribution at the expense of
programs beneting a large majority of voters. Finally, Morelli (2004) analyzes
a more complex game (with party formation) in which there are three equal
sized districts and a continuum of voters. He only considers sincere voting
and a simple form of strategic voting. The main result is that for asymmetric
distribution of policy preferences the policy outcome under proportional election
is more moderate than the one with plurality, while when preferences are similar
across districts both plurality and proportional rules lead to the median voters
preferred policy outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general setup of
the model, and then we solve the multidistrict majoritarian election in Section
3, and the proportional one in Section 4. We devote Section 5 to the comparison
of the policy outcomes under the two systems, and, nally, Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
Consider a society electing a parliament of k members.
The policy space. The unidimensional policy space X is a closed interval of
the real line, and without loss of generality we assume X = [0; 1].
Parties. There are two parties, indexed by p 2 P = fL;Rg. Each party p is
characterized by a policy position p 2 X, such that L < R.
Voters. There is a nite set of voters N = f1; 2; :::; ng. Each voter i 2 N has
a most preferred policy (his bliss point, sometimes referred to as his location)
i 2 X. Voterspreferences are single peaked and symmetric. Let us denote as
ui(X) player is utility function over the policy space. Given the set of parties
P , each voter i casts his vote for one of them. Hence, the pure strategy set
of voter i is given by Si = fL;Rg, and let denote S = S1  S2  :::  Sn. A
mixed strategy of player i is a vector i = (Li ; 
R
i ) where each 
p
i represents
the probability that player i votes for party p 2 P . As usual, the mixed strategy
which assigns probability one to a pure strategy will be denoted by such a pure
strategy.
The electoral rule. Voters vote to elect a parliament composed by k represen-
tatives. Given a pure strategy combination s 2 S, the electoral rule determines
the composition of the parliament, that is to say the seats allocated to each
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party. We consider two di¤erent electoral rules: majority rule and proportional
rule (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Let ' : S ! f0; 1; :::; kg be the function
that maps votes into the number of seats allocated to party L, being the seats
of R simply k   '(s).
The policy outcome. The nal policy outcome is the result of a bargaining
process among parties. We do not explicitly model this bargaining process but
we assume that it depends only on the number of seats each party has in the
parliament. In other words we assume the existence of a function X(:) that
maps the number of seats obtained by party L into the policy space, i.e., X :
f0; 1; :::; kg ! X. We assume that X(:) is a decreasing function, that is to say
the more seats L obtains, the more leftist the policy is.
Given the electoral rule ' and the policy outcome function X, the utility
that voter i 2 N gets under the pure strategy combination s is:
Ui(s) = ui(X('(s))):
Given a mixed strategy combination  = (1; :::; n), because players make
their choice independently of each other, the probability that s = (s1; s2; :::; sn)
occurs is:
(s) =
Y
i2N
sii :
The expected utility that player i gets under the mixed strategy combination
 is:
Ui() =
X
(s)Ui(s):
In the following, as usual, we shall write  = ( i; i), where  i =
(1; :::i 1; i+1; :::n) denotes the (n  1) tuple of strategies of the players
other than i. Furthermore si will denote the mixed strategy i that gives prob-
ability one to the pure strategy si.
For j 2 f1; 2; :::; kg, dene j = X(j)+X(j 1)2 . If a voter i 2 N has his
bliss point equal to j such a voter is indi¤erent between a parliament with j
members of L and one with just (j   1) members of L. In order to simplify the
reading, and the writing, of the paper we assume that no such a voter exists.6
An outcome is a probability distribution over policies, well call purean
outcome that assigns probability one to a given policy, and well denote it by
that policy.7
6Case by case we will discuss what happens if such an assumption is not satised, but the
general discuss and the main propositions will be developed under such an assumption.
7We should have used the term degenerate outcome, but we have preferred the above
terminology.
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3 The multidistrict majoritarian election
We rst consider a situation in which there are k districts, indexed by d 2 D =
f1; 2; :::; kg. Voters are hence distributed in the k districts and let Nd be the set
of voters in district d, i.e. N1; N2; :::; Nk is the partition of N in the k districts.8
We assume that in each district d there is an odd number of voters nd. Let
md 2 M = fm1; :::;mkg be the median voter in district d, and, without loss
of generality, assume that m1  m2  :::  mk. Let us dene the distribution
Fm () = f#md 2M s.t. md  g.9
In each district voters elect a representative belonging either to party L or to
party R by majority rule. Given a pure strategy combination s = (s1; s2; :::; sn) ;
let sd = (si)i2Nd be the pure strategy combination of the voters in district d.
District d is won by the party which gets more votes and let DL(s) be the
districts where L wins, hence the electoral rule 'M is simply:
'M (s) = #DL(s).
3.1 The solution
The above game is a typical example of a situation in which the use of the
Nash solution concept is completely inadequate. As a matter of fact, in every
district, the election of any candidate is a Nash equilibrium outcome, if there
are at least three voters. Di¤erently from standard models with two parties,
in this case not even the concept of undominated equilibria seems appropriate.
As a matter of fact, if a voters bliss point is located (strictly) in between k
and 1, it follows that such a voter does not have any dominated strategy.
As a consequence, if all the bliss points are in between k and 1, not even
sophisticated voting can help us shape the set of solutions, that is to say for every
possible composition of the parliament there exists a sophisticated equilibrium
leading to that composition of the parliament. We then need to use a solution
concept stronger than undominated equilibrium. Limiting the analysis to pure
strategies we will show the existence of a unique perfect equilibrium outcome.
Allowing for mixed strategies uniqueness cannot be hoped for, nevertheless the
above outcome is the only pureone, i.e. the only one assigning probability 1
to a given policy.
Instead of working directly with perfect equilibria we prefer to introduce
the weaker (as we will show later) concept of district sincerity. In words, a
strategy combination is district sincere if, given the strategies of the players in
8Notice that with uppercase we denote sets, and with lowercase their cardinality. Hence
N1 is the set of voters in district 1, and by n1 we denote the number of them.
9The assumption about the oddness of the number of voters in each district assures that
the electoral result does not end in a tie. This implies two things. First, a pure strategy
combination leads to what we have dened as a pure outcome. Second, the median is
uniquely dened. We could have skipped this assumption by dealing with a deterministic
tie-breaking rule and by dening accordingly the median. A preliminary cost-benet analysis
suggested us to make use of this assumption.
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the other districts, every voter who strictly prefers party L/R winning in his
district votes for party L/R. Formally, given , we shall write  =
 
 d; d

,
where  d = (i)i2NNd denotes the (n  nd) tuple of strategies of the players
outside the district d while d = (i)i2Nd denotes the nd tuple of strategies of
the players in the district d. Moreover, let Ld
 
Rd

denote the nd tuple of pure
strategies of the players in the district d where everybody votes for L10 (R).11
Denition 1 District-sincerity. A strategy combination  is district-sincere if
for every district d and for every player i in district d the following holds:
Ui
 
 d; Ld
  Ui   d; Rd > 0 then i = L
Ui
 
 d; Ld
  Ui   d; Rd < 0 then i = R
Notice that every district-sincere strategy combination is an equilibrium,
because a player a¤ects the outcome only if he is pivotal in his district and
district sincerity implies that the outcome is a¤ected in the rightdirection.
Now, we will prove that there is only a pure strategy district sincere outcome.
To this end let us dene:12
dM =

0 if m1 > 1
max d s.t md  d if m1  1: (1)
In words, given all districts d such that the median voter location md is on the
left of d (i.e. the average of the outcomes when L wins d and (d  1) districts),
we take the rightmost of them. In the following we prove that the unique pure
strategy district sincere outcome is the outcome where party L wins exactly dM
districts.
Proposition 1 X
 
dM

is the unique pure strategy district-sincere equilibrium
outcome.13
10Hence, L wins district d.
11For simplicity, we write the denition of district sincerity with the nd-tuple of strategies
of the players in district d given by everybody voting for L=R. Obviously, we could, at a cost
of an heavier notation, have written any nd-tuple of strategies leading to the winning of L=R
in district d.
12We remind that we have assumed that no bliss point equal to 1 exists and so m1 6= 1,
and analogously md 6= d. However since we are going to discuss in some cases also what
happens if these condidions do not hold, we prefer to dene d independently from the above
conditions.
13 In case m d =  d, we would have two di¤erent possible outcome X( d) and X( d  1).
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Proof. We rst prove that it exists a pure strategy district sincere equilibrium
(PDSE) with outcome X
 
dM

.
Consider the following strategy combination s = (s1; :::; sn) with:
si = L if i 2 d  dM and i <  dM or i 2 d > dM and i <  dM+1
si = R if i 2 d  dM and i >  dM or i 2 d > dM and i >  dM+1
(i.e., in every district d  dM , every voter i with i <  dM votes for party L,
and every voter i with i >  dM votes for party R; in every district d > d
M :
every voter i with i <  dM+1 votes for L, and every voter i with i >  dM+1
votes for party R).
Notice that under s party L wins every district d  dM , because in such a
case md < d, while R wins all the district d > dM , because in such a case
md > d   dM+1, hence the outcome of s is X( dM ). Furthermore s is district
sincere, because in every district where L wins voters who prefer X( dM ) to
X( dM   1) vote for L and the others for R, while in the district where R wins
voters vote accordingly to their preferences over X( dM ) and X( dM + 1).
We now prove that no other PDSE outcome exists. Suppose we have an equilib-
rium with d^ 6= dM districts won by L: District-sincerity implies that in districts
won by L, every voter i with i < d^ votes for L, and every voter i with i > d^
votes in favor of party R. Moreover, in districts in which R is getting the ma-
jority, voter i with i < d^+1 votes for L, and voter i with i > d^+1 votes for
R. Suppose rst that d^ < dM , then it must be  dM  d^+1 < d^ and hence
district-sincerity implies that party L gets at least dM districts, which contra-
dicts X

d^

being a district sincere equilibrium outcome. Mutatis mutandis,
d^ > dM implies d^+1 < d^   dM+1 and this with district sincerity and the
fact that  dM+1 < m dM+1implies party R wins at least
 
k   dM districts, and,
hence, party L wins at most dM districts contradicting X

d^

being a district
sincere equilibrium outcome.
Given the assumption that no voter is located in j (j = 1; :::; k), if  is
district sincere and assigns probability one to a given policy, then  is a pure
strategy combination. Hence, we have:
Corollary 2 X
 
dM

is the unique pure outcome induced by district-sincere
equilibria.
3.1.1 Perfect equilibrium
The concept of perfect equilibrium was introduced by Selten (1975):
Denition 2 A completely mixed strategy " is an "-perfect equilibrium if
10
8i 2 N; 8si; s0i 2 Si
if Ui
 
si; 
"
 i

> Ui

s
0
i; 
"
 1

then
"i

s
0
i

 ".
A strategy combination  is a perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence f"g
of "-perfect equilibria converging (for "! 0) to .
Because a dominated strategy is never a best reply to a completely mixed
strategy of the opponent and, hence, in every "-perfect equilibrium it is played
with probability less than ", the perfect equilibrium concept is a renement of
the undominated equilibrium concept. The next proposition shows that, in this
model, it is a renement also of district sincerity.
Proposition 3 Every perfect equilibrium  is district sincere.
Proof. Let fi () denote the probability player i is pivotal under the strategy
combination  in his district d. Clearly, we can write:
Ui (L;  i)  Ui (R;  i) = fi ()

Ui
 
 d; Ld
  Ui   d; Rd (2)
and, if  >> 0, then fi () is strictly positive. Suppose now  is not district
sincere. This implies there exists a district d and a player i 2 Nd such that either
Ui
 
 d; Ld
 Ui   d; Rd > 0 and i(R) > 0 or Ui   d; Ld Ui   d; Rd <
0 and i(L) > 0. Let us consider the rst case. Take a sequence of completely
mixed strategy combinations " converging to . Su¢ ciently close to , fi (")
is strictly positive as well as
h
Ui

"
 d
; Ld

  Ui

"
 d
; Rd
i
and hence R is
not a best reply for player i. It follows that if " is a sequence of " perfect
equilibria, "i (R)  "; and hence i(R) = 0: Mutatis mutandis the second case.
Propositions 1 and 3 directly imply that the only possible pure strategy
perfect equilibrium outcome of the model can be X
 
dM

. Because not every
district-sincere equilibrium is perfect, we still have to prove that there exists a
pure strategies perfect equilibrium whose outcome is X
 
dM

. This is accom-
plished considering s as dened in the proof of Proposition 1. From (2), it is
immediate that s is a best reply to every strategy combination su¢ ciently close
to it, hence perfect.14 Then, we have:
Proposition 4 X
 
dM

is the unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome.
14This shows also that s is a strictly perfect equilibrium (Okada, 1981) and a stable set as
dened in Kholberg and Mertens (1986). Notice that s is an absorbing retract (Kalai and
Samet, 1984) and, hence, also a stable set accordingly to the denition of Mertens (1989).
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Moreover, from Corollary 2, Propositions 3 and 4 immediately follows that:
Corollary 5 X
 
dM

is the unique pure outcome induced by perfect equilib-
ria.
We now introduce an example that will be useful in discussing all the main
features of this type of voting games. Despite the fact that for every possible
outcome there is an undominated equilibrium of the example with that outcome,
the game has a unique pure strategy district-sincere equilibrium outcome, which
is also the only pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, such
a unique outcome may result from two di¤erent equilibria. Hence, a uniqueness
result (in terms of equilibrium strategies) cannot be hoped for. Furthermore,
also a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, supporting the district-sincere equilib-
rium outcome with some probability (positive, but di¤erent from one). Hence,
the uniqueness of the outcome must rely either on the use of pure strategies,
or, when mixed strategies are allowed, on limiting the analysis to outcomes
assigning probability one to a given policy.
3.2 Example 1
The partiespositions are L = 0:1 and R = 0:9. There are two districts 1 and 2
with three voters each. Both districts have one voter with bliss point in 0:31 and
one in 0:69: The medians are located in m1 = 0:4 and m2 = 0:6. Policies are:
X (0) = 0:9 > X (1) = 0:5 > X (2) = 0:1. Every voter is utility is simply minus
the distance between his bliss point and the policy X. Because 2 = 0:3 and
1 = 0:7 the game has no dominated strategies and, hence, everybody voting for
L is an undominated equilibrium with outcome X (2) = 0:1. Analogously, we
have an undominated equilibrium where everybody votes for R with outcome
X (0) = 0:9.
According to Proposition 1, X (1) = 0:5 is the unique pure strategy district-
sincere equilibrium outcome and according to Proposition 3 is the only pure
strategy perfect equilibrium outcome.
Nevertheless, there are two di¤erent pure strategy district sincere and perfect
equilibria.15 In one every voter in district 1 votes for L and every voter in district
2 votes for R, in the other every voter in district 1 votes for R and every voter
in district 2 votes for L.
The game has also a mixed equilibrium () in which voters in 0:31 vote for
L, voters in 0:69 vote for R, while the median voter in district 1 plays the mixed
strategy 13L +
2
3R and the median voter in district 2 plays
2
3L +
1
3R. Under
, X (0) occurs with probability 29 ; X (2) with probability
2
9 and X (1) with
probability 59 .
15Both of them are also strictly perfect and stable.
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It is easy to verify that this equilibrium (i.e. ) is district sincere. Consider
voters in district 1: the strategy combination of the voters in district 2 implies
party L wins with probability equal to 23 in district 2. In such a case the
median voter of district 1 is indi¤erent between a leftist or a rightist winning in
his district, while the voter located in 0:31 strictly prefers that district 1 is won
by L,16 while the voter located in 0:69 will prefer that district 1 is won by R.17
Similarly for voters in district 2.
Now we want to prove that  is perfect and that even applying stronger so-
lution concept than perfection as strategic stability (Mertens, 1989) we cannot
eliminate it. Notice that  is also quasi-strict (this easily follows from  being
district-sincere and from the fact that, given that in each district the median
voter randomizes and the other two voters vote one for L and one for R, vot-
ers are pivotal with positive probability). From that it easily follows that it
is isolated because the equilibria near  can be studied simply analyzing the
following 2  2 game ( ) among the two median voters (the row player being
the one in district 1).
L R
L  0:3; 0:5  0:1; 0:1
R  0:1; 0:1  0:5; 0:3
This game has two pure strategy equilibria (L;R), (R;L) and a mixed one 
1
3L+
2
3R;
2
3L+
1
3R

which correspond to . Since
 
1
3L+
2
3R;
2
3L+
1
3R

is iso-
lated and quasi-strict then it is a strongly stable equilibrium of   (cf. van
Damme, 1991:55, th 3.4.4). Moreover, because the other players are using their
strict best reply in , it follows that  is a strongly stable equilibrium (Kojima
et. al., 1985) of the voting game, and, hence, a Mertensstable set.
4 Proportional representation
We study now the electoral rule corresponding to proportional representation.
We analyze the case (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) where there is only one
voting district electing k representatives. We assume, without loss of generality,
that votersbliss policies are ordered such that 1  2  :::  n, and are
distributed in such a national district accordingly to the distribution F () =
f#i 2 N s.t. i  g.
Voters elect representatives belonging to party L and R by proportional
rule. There are various rules used in proportional system to transform votes
into seats, we use a very general one, which allows, for example, any majority
16Because 1
3
( 0:19) + 2
3
( 0:21) > 1
3
( 0:59) + 2
3
( 0:19:)
17Because 1
3
( 0:21) + 2
3
( 0:19) > 1
3
( 0:19) + 2
3
( 0:59)
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premium. To get d representatives, d = 0; 1; :::; k, party L needs at least nd
number of votes (i.e. to elect exactly d representatives party L needs a number
of votes in between [nd; nd+1)).18
Given a pure strategy combination s = (s1; s2; :::; sn) let NLd (s) be the set
of citizens voting for party L under s, and let us dene by nLd (s) its cardinality.
Hence, there exists a unique d such that nLd 2 [nd ; nd+1), and the electoral
rule 'P is simply:
'P (s) = d.
4.1 The solution
Similarly to the majoritarian case previously studied, because voters located in
between 1 and k do not have any dominant strategy, also in this case we
need a stronger solution concept than undominated equilibrium. Limiting the
analysis to pure strategy equilibria we prove that there exists a unique perfect
equilibrium outcome. Moreover, this is the unique pureoutcome.
To this end let us give the following denition:
dP =

0 if F (1) < n1
max d s.t F (d)  nd if F (1)  n1 (3)
In words, dP is the maximum number of seats for the left party such that the
number of voters whose bliss points are on the left of d (that is the outcome
averaging a parliament with d and d  1 seats for L) is greater or equal to the
minimum number of votes needed to elect d representatives for party L.
Proposition 6 X
 
dP

is the unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome
and the unique pureoutcome induced by perfect equilibria.
Proof. We rst prove that there exists a perfect equilibrium with the unique
pureoutcome X
 
dP

.
We have to analyze three cases:19
i) dP 6= k and n dP >  dP+1
Consider the following strategy combination s = (s1; :::; sn) with:
si = L if i 2 [1; 2; :::; n dP ]
si = R if i 2 [n dP + 1; :::; n]
18Analogously to the multidistrict majoritarian case (see footnote 9) we rely on the use of
a deterministic rule to determine the seatsallocation.
19 In order to avoid duplication of proof, if dP = 0, let 0 = 0 and hence refer to (ii).
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Notice that under s exactly dP seats are won by L. Now we show that s is
perfect
Notice that L is a strict best reply for every i 2 [1; 2; :::; n dP ], because if one
of them vote for R instead L the outcome moves from X
 
dP

to X
 
dP   1
which is worst for them because they are located to the left of  dP : Consider
the completely mixed strategy combination " :
"i = (1  "n)L+ "nR if i 2 [1; 2; :::; n dP ]
"i = (1  ")R+ "L if i 2 [n dP + 1; :::; n]
We claim that, for " su¢ ciently close to zero; " is an "  perfect equilibrium.
Because L is a strict best reply to s for i 2 [1; 2; :::; n dP ] it is also for close-by
strategies. Notice that the probability a player i 2 [n dP + 1; :::; n] is pivotal
between the election of dP and dP +1 of L candidates is innitely greater than
every other probability in which his vote matters. Because all these players are
located to the right of  dP+1 R is preferred for them to L and, hence, 
" is an
"  perfect equilibrium. Therefore s is perfect.
ii) dP 6= k and n dP <  dP+1
Let ~n the larger i such that i <  dP+1: By the denition of d
P and because
n dP <  dP+1; we have ~n 2

n dP ; n dP+1

: Consider the following strategy
combination ~s:
~si = L if i 2 [1; 2; :::; ~n]
~si = R if i 2 [~n+ 1; :::; n]
Notice that under ~s exactly dP seats are won by L. Now we show that ~s is
perfect. To this end consider the completely mixed strategy combination " :
"i = (1  "n)L+ "nR if i 2 [1; 2; :::; ~n]
"i = (1  ")R+ "L if i 2 [~n+ 1; :::; n]
We claim that, for " su¢ ciently close to zero; " is an "  perfect equilibrium.
Notice that the probability a player is pivotalbetween the election of dP and
dP +1 of L candidates is innitely greater than every other probability in which
15
his vote matters. Because for all the players located to the left (right) of  dP+1,
L(R) is preferred to R(L), " is an "   perfect equilibrium. Therefore ~s is
perfect
iii) dP = k
Let n the larger i such that i < k. By the denition of dP we have that
n  nk. Consider the following strategy combination s:
si = L if i 2 [1; 2; :::; n]
si = R if i 2 [n+ 1; :::; n]
Notice that under s all the k seats are won by L: Moreover for every completely
mixed strategy combination close to s, the probability a player is pivotalbe-
tween the election of k and k  1 of L candidates is innitely greater than every
other probability in which his vote matters. Hence, s is perfect.
Now we prove that no other pureoutcome is induced by a perfect equilibrium.
Suppose we have a perfect equilibrium  which induces X () as policy out-
come. Because for every sequence of completely mixed strategy combination
converging to , for every player, the probability of the event being pivotal
between X ( + 1) and X () is innitely greater than the probability of the
event being pivotal between X ( + j) and X ( + 1 + j)(j = 1; ::; k      1)
and the probability of the event being pivotal between X () and X (   1)is
innitely greater than the the probability of the event being pivotal between
X (   j) and X (   1  j)(j = 1; ::; k      1) we must have:
() 8i s:t: i < +1 i = L
() 8i s:t: i >  i = R
Suppose  < dP : This would imply that +1   dP , and, by (), it follows
that in  party L would receive at least n dP contradicting the fact that just 
of its candidates are elected.
Suppose  > dP : Notice that  > dP implies that  dP+1   and the above
condition () implies that in  party R takes at least all the votes of the voters
located to the right of  dP+1: By the denition of d
P ; it follows that, even if
all the others voters vote for L; the leftist party cannot win dP +1 seats, which
contradicts  > dP .
5 Comparing electoral systems
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium outcome in the single district pro-
portional and the multidistrict majority system. Such a comparison is made
straightforward by our uniqueness results. For the sake of the comparison,
in this section we specify a particular electoral rule dictating the minimum
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number of votes required to elect a member of parliament when the single dis-
trict proportional system is adopted. The minimum number of votes needed
to elect d members of parliament with the single district proportional system is
n
k (d  1)+ 12 nk .20 In case the multidistrict majority system is used, the electoral
rule requires the leftist party to obtain at least half of a district votes in order
to carry the district. We remind the reader that we dened with X

d
P

the
unique perfect equilibrium outcome in the single district proportional and with
X

d
M

as the unique district sincere equilibrium outcome in the multidistrict
majority systems.
When a multidistrict majority system is adopted, the electoral outcome may
depend on how voters are distributed across districts. Since the electoral out-
come is instead independent of votersdistribution across districts when a single
district proportional system is adopted, the comparison of electoral outcomes
between the two systems is bound to be a¤ected by the distribution of voters
across districts. In order to get to grips with such an issue, we consider two
extreme distributions of voters across districts. We rst look at a situation of
homogeneity across districts. This case represents a society where districts of
the multidistrict majority system are similar to each other and similar to the
single district of the proportional system, in terms of the political preferences
of their voters. More specically districts are homogeneous in the sense that
their median voters have the same preferences which, hence, coincide with the
preferences of the median voter of the single district in the proportional system.
We then examine a case of heterogeneity across districts. In this alternative so-
ciety, districts of the multidistrict majority system are characterized by diverse
political orientations, with some districts being a stronghold of the leftist party
some others a stronghold of the rightist party and some other districts inhabited
by voters with more mixed political orientations. Specically we consider a sit-
uation of extreme heterogeneity across districts where - equally sized- districts
have been ordered according to the political preferences of their voters, with the
rst district being inhabited by the rst nk most leftist voters, the second by the
next nk most leftist voters and the following districts being inhabited each by
n
k
increasingly more rightist voters.
We nd that in the case of homogeneity across districts, the outcome may
di¤er depending on which electoral system is adopted. A single district pro-
portional system favours a more moderate outcome, since it protects minorities
dispersed in di¤erent districts more than a multidistrict majority system. In
the case of extreme heterogeneity across districts, the outcomes are instead the
same independently of the electoral system. Di¤erences in electoral outcomes
are a joint product of the electoral system and the distribution of voters. In
societies where leftist voters are concentrated in some districts and rightist vot-
ers in others the choice of the electoral system - proportional vs. multidistrict
majority- will tend not to a¤ect the political outcome, while in societies where
electoral districts are similar to each other in terms of the political preferences
20Given our assumptions, we never incur a tie in the remainder.
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of their voters, the outcome will tend to be more moderate when elections are
held with a proportional system than when elections are held with a multidis-
trict majority system. This is fairly intuitive since with a lower concentration
of like-minded voters, in a multidistrict majority system fewer votes are wasted
on a candidate who would win anyway.
5.1 Homogeneity across districts
We rst consider a situation in which each district of the multidistrict majority
system has the same median voter as the single district of the proportional
system, i.e. md = m for all d. The example that follows, points out that the
two systems may give rise to di¤erent outcomes in this case.
Example 2. Consider a society with six voters electing a parliament of
two members, i.e. n = 6; k = 2; two parties with preferred policies L = 0
and R = 1 respectively and the following symmetric outcome function X (2) =
0 < X (1) = 12 < X (0) = 1. The averages of consecutive outcomes are thus
2 =
X(2)+X(1)
2 =
1
4 and 1 =
X(1)+X(0)
2 =
3
4 . Four of the six voters are leftist,
having zero as their preferred policy, i.e. their bliss points are 1 = 2 = 3 =
4 = 0; and the remaining two are rightist, having one as their preferred policy,
i.e. 5 = 6 = 1: If the multidistrict majority system is adopted, two districts
- inhabited by three voters each- elect a member of parliament each. A party
carries a district if it obtains at least two votes in the district. District 1 is
inhabited by two voters with bliss point in 0 and one voter with bliss point in
1, i.e. the three voters in district one are 1 = 2 = 0 and 5 = 1; and district 2
is inhabited by two voters with bliss point in 0 and one voter with bliss point in
1, i.e. the three voters in district two are 3 = 4 = 0 and 6 = 1: Observe that
the median voter in each of the two district is a voter with 0 as his preferred
policy, i.e. m1 = m2 = 0. If the single district proportional system is adopted,
the six voters all belong to the single district and the electoral rule prescribes
that at least 62
 
d  12

votes are needed to elect d representatives. Observe that
the median voter in the single district is a voter with 0 as his preferred policy,
i.e. m = 0. The unique district sincere equilibrium outcome of the multidistrict
majority system is X

d
M

= X (2) = 0; i.e. the leftist party obtains two
members of parliament and implements its preferred policy: Indeed, observe
that 2 = 14 > m2 = 0: On the other hand the unique perfect equilibrium
outcome of the proportional system is X

d
P

= X (1) = 12 ; i.e. the leftist
party obtains one member of parliament and implements a moderate policy.
Indeed, observe that F (1) = 4 > 3
 
1
2

= 1:5 and F (2) = 4 < 3
 
3
2

= 4:5:
In the multidistrict majority system two votes are enough to carry a district
and thus four votes are enough to elect two members of parliament. The elec-
toral rule of the proportional system, however, requires more than four votes to
elect two members of parliament. The election result is markedly di¤erent in the
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two cases, with a two-nil victory for the left in the multidistrict majority sys-
tem and a one-one draw in the proportional system. The policies implemented,
which depend on the parliamentary strength of a party, di¤er as well in the two
cases, with a more moderate policy in the second case. The example suggests
that in a multidistrict majority system - with fairly homogeneous districts- a
party may obtain a landslide victory in terms of seats in parliament without a
corresponding landslide victory in terms of the number of votes, while in a pro-
portional system there would be a closer relationship between number of seats
in parliament and number of votes. The proportional system tends to moderate
the electoral outcome. This happens because a minority of voters dispersed in
di¤erent districts will be able to elect fewer members of parliament in a mul-
tidistrict majority system than in a single district proportional system. Since
the nal policy decision that is implemented is closer to a party preferred policy
the stronger its parliamentary force is, the single district proportional system
is conducive to a more moderate policy outcome. The following proposition
proves that this intuition carries over to less special situations. In order to be
able to compare leftist and rightist policies to moderate ones in a sensible way,
we assume that the outcome function is symmetric around the mid point of the
policy interval. We prove that the equilibrium policy outcome - if the single dis-
trict proportional system is adopted as an electoral system- is not farther away
from the mid point of the policy interval than the equilibrium policy outcome
in case the electoral system adopted is the multidistrict majority one.
Proposition 7 Assume that md = m ,8d, and that X (d) is symmetric around
1
2 ,
21 then:
a. if X

d
M

 12 ; X

d
M

 X

d
P

 12 ;
b. if X

d
M

> 12 ;
1
2  X

d
P

 X

d
M

.
Proof. Part a. We rst prove that X

d
M

 X

d
P

. Given that
X

d
M

 12 , suppose, contrary to the thesis, that X

d
P

< X

d
M

; i.e.
d
P
> d
M
and 
d
P < 
d
M . Since X

d
M

is the unique district sincere equilib-
rium outcome, it has to be that 
d
P < m
d
P , otherwise X

d
P

would be the
district sincere equilibrium outcome instead. Since by assumption md = m, 8d,
then 
d
P < m: Since m is the median of every district, F
 

d
P

< n2 . More-
over, X

d
P

is the equilibrium outcome in the proportional election hence:
F
 

d
P
  nk dP   12. These observations together imply:
n
2
> F
 

d
P
  n
k

d
P   1
2

.
21That is to say X (k   j) = 1 X (j), j = 0; 1; 2; :::; k.
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For n2 >
n
k

d
P   12

to hold, it has to be that d
P
< k+12 , which directly implies
d
P  k2 . Observe that symmetry of X (d) implies that the number of members
of parliament the leftist party obtains is at least half of the total when the
outcome is to the left of 12 , i.e. d
M  k2 . Since we argued above that d
P
can
be at most equal to k2 and we assumed it is higher than d
M
which is at least as
high as k2 , we obtain
k
2  d
P
> d
M  k2 . This is impossible because d
P
and d
M
are integer numbers. We conclude that d
P  dM and thus X

d
P

 X

d
M

.
We are left to show that X

d
P

 12 . Assume, contrary to the thesis, that
X

d
P

> 12 , hence d
M
> d
P
and by symmetry of X (d) around 12 we have

d
P
+1
 12 . Notice that if k even

d
P
+ 1

 k2 as well as if k is odd

d
P
+ 1


k+1
2 . In both cases

d
P
+ 1

 k+12 . Furthermore, notice that F


d
P
+1

> n2 ,
since we know that 
d
P
+1
 
d
M  m. Then we have that:
F


d
P
+1

>
n
2
=
n
k

k + 1
2
  1
2

 n
k

d
P
+ 1

  1
2

which contradicts 3. We conclude that X

d
M

 X

d
P

 12 .
Part b. We rst prove that X

d
P

 X

d
M

. Given that X

d
M

> 12 ,
suppose, contrary to the thesis, that X

d
P

> X

d
M

, i.e. d
P
< d
M
and

d
P > 
d
M . Since X

d
M

is the district sincere equilibrium outcome it has to
be that m
d
M  
d
M . Since md = m ,8d, m  dM . Since m is the median,
n
2  F (m). These observations together imply:
n
2
 F (m)  F  
d
M

.
Observe that nk

d
M   12

< n2 , since by symmetry of X (d), d
M
< k2 . Then d
M
is greater than d
P
and such that nk

d
M   12

 F  
d
M

, contradicting that
X

d
P

is the equilibrium outcome in the proportional election. We conclude
that d
P  dM and thus X

d
P

 X

d
M

.
We are left to show that 12  X

d
P

. Suppose 12 > X

d
P

, i.e. d
P  k+12 .
District sincerity implies 
d
P < m (because 
d
M  
d
P and 
d
M < m). This,
in turn, implies that F
 

d
P

< n2 , since m is the median voter. Observe that
n
2  nk

d
P   12

when d
P  k+12 . Thus:
F
 

d
P

<
n
k

d
P   1
2

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which contradicts 3. We conclude that X

d
M

 X

d
P

 12 .
5.2 Heterogeneity across districts
We now consider a situation of extreme heterogeneity across districts. We have
in mind a society where some districts are the stronghold of the leftist party and
some others of the rightist party. Specically, the k districts of the multidistrict
majority system are inhabited by the same odd number of voters, nd = nk ; for all
d. Moreover, districts have been ordered according to the political preferences
of their voters, with the rst district being inhabited by the rst nk most leftist
voters, the second by the next nk most leftist voters and the following districts
being inhabited each by nk increasingly more rightist voters. Thus median voters
in each district are ordered, with m1  m2  :::  md  :::  mk.
Example 2 (Continued). Consider a society identical to the one presented
in Example 2 except for the distribution of voters in the two districts of the
multidistrict majority system. In this alternative society, district 1 is inhabited
by three leftist voters, with bliss points 1 = 2 = 3 = 0 and median voterm1 =
0; while district 2 is inhabited by one leftist voter and two rightist voters, i.e.
by voters with bliss points 4 = 0; 5 = 6 = 1 and median voter m2 = 1: The
unique district sincere equilibrium outcome of the multidistrict majority system
is X

d
M

= X (1) = 12 : i.e. the leftist party obtains one member of parliament
and implements a moderate policy. Indeed, observe that 1 = 34 > m1 = 0 and
2 =
1
4 < m2 = 1: The unique perfect equilibrium outcome of the proportional
system is X

d
P

= X (1) = 12 : Indeed, observe that F (1) = 4 > 3
 
1
2

= 1:5
and F (2) = 4 < 3
 
3
2

= 4:5:
The example presents a society were leftist voters are more concentrated
in one district of the multidistrict majority system. One of their votes is - so
to speak- wasted, in the sense that the leftist candidate in district 1 would
be elected even with only two votes in his favour, while an extra vote would
be useful to elect the leftist candidate in district 2. The following proposition
proves that such an intuition carries over to more general situations and the
two electoral systems - i.e. the single district proportional and multidistrict
majority system- give rise to the same equilibrium outcome when districts are
equally sized and ordered from left to right.
Proposition 8 If districts are equally sized and ordered from left to right, then
X

d
P

= X

d
M

.
Proof. Contrary to the thesis, suppose rst X

d
P

> X

d
M

; i.e. d
P
<
d
M
and 
d
P > 
d
M : Recall that d
M
is the maximum d satisfying d  md.
Furthermore, F
 

d
M
  F  m
d
M

: Since districts are ordered and of equal size,
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the total number of voters up to and including the median voter of a generic
district d is at least equal to the number of voters in all previous districts -
n
k (d  1)- plus half of the voters in that district - nk 12 -, i.e. F (md) > nk (d  1)+
n
k
1
2 =
n
k
 
d  12

22 for all d. Hence, it follows:
F
 

d
M

>
n
k

d
M   1
2

.
This contradicts X

d
P

being the equilibrium outcome in the proportional
election, since we found a higher d satisfying F (d)  nk
 
d  12

. We conclude
that X

d
P

 X

d
M

.
Contrary to the thesis, suppose now that X

d
P

< X

d
M

, i.e. d
P
> d
M
and 
d
P < 
d
M . Since d
M
is by denition the maximum d satisfying d  md
and we are assuming d
P
> d
M
, it follows that 
d
P < m
d
P . Given that districts
are equally sized and ordered, the total number of voters strictly to the left of
the median voter of a generic district d is strictly smaller than the number of
voters in all previous districts - nk (d  1)- plus half of the voters in that district
- nk
1
2 -, i.e. for d < md; F (d) <
n
k (d  1) + nk 12 = nk
 
d  12

for all d: Since

d
P < m
d
P ; it follows that:
F
 

d
P

<
n
k

d
P   1
2

which contradicts 3.
We conclude that X

d
P

= X

d
M

.
6 Conclusions
We have studied a model of rational voters electing a parliament by voting for
candidates belonging to two parties. Such a model contributes to the non-
majoritarian literature of legislative election, in that it focuses not on which
party has the majority in parliament, but rather on the composition of it, where
by composition we mean indeed the number of seats parties win in the legisla-
ture. Hence, we do not rely on the usual simplifying assumption that translates
votes share into equal seats share.
Legislative elections may di¤er in many dimensions, we focus on what we
believe is the most important one: the electoral rules. Specically, we analyze
the two most popular electoral rules in modern democracies: multidistrict ma-
jority and purely proportional representation. In both systems we prove the
existence of a unique pure strategies perfect equilibrium outcome, which is the
unique pureoutcome induced by perfect equilibria.
22The strict inequality sign follows from the fact that n
k
is odd.
22
The uniqueness of the outcome allows us to carry out a comparison of the
policies under the two systems. We analyze it upon various distributions of
players bliss policies showing that the outcomes do not coincide - except in a
peculiar case- and that the proportional system tends to lead to more moderate
outcomes.
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